We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity of fair allocations. We study the problem of nding an allocation that is Paretooptimal. While it is easy to nd an e cient allocation when the underlying graph is a path or a star, the problem is NP-hard for many other graph topologies, even for trees of bounded pathwidth or of maximum degree 3. We show that on a path, there are instances where no Pareto-optimal allocation satis es envy-freeness up to one good, and that it is NP-hard to decide whether such an allocation exists, even for binary valuations. We also show that, for a path, it is NP-hard to nd a Pareto-optimal allocation that satis es maximin share, but show that a moving-knife algorithm can nd such an allocation when agents have binary valuations that have a non-nested interval structure.
. Overview of our complexity results. Hardness results marked * hold under Turing reductions. The result † refers to the pseudo-polynomial algorithm by Barman et al. [2018] . The hardness results hold even for additive and binary valuations.
solution satis es EF1 while also being Pareto-optimal. We investigate whether such tradeo s exist in the connected se ing.
Contributions.
• For additive valuations, we show that one can nd a Pareto-optimum in polynomial time when G is a path or a star.
• We show that, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that nds a Paretooptimum when G is a tree, even if valuations are additive and binary, and even if the tree has bounded pathwidth, bounded diameter, or bounded maximum degree. Finding a Pareto-optimum is also hard valuations are 2-additive and G is a path or a star.
• When G is a tree, there always exists an allocation which is both Pareto-optimal and satis es MMS. However, such an allocation is NP-hard to nd, even when G is a path; the problem stays hard when weakening MMS to α-MMS for any α > 0. For a restricted class of binary valuations (non-nested intervals), we give a polynomial-time algorithm.
• When G is a path, we give examples with binary additive valuations for which no Paretooptimal EF1 allocation exists, and show that it is NP-hard to decide whether such an allocation exists.
Related Work ere is a rich body of the literature on fair division of a divisible cake into connected pieces. Such a division satisfying envy-freeness always exists [Stromquist, 1980] ; nevertheless, it cannot be obtained in nite steps even when the cake is divided among three agents [Stromquist, 2008] . In contrast, several e cient algorithms are known to yield a contiguous proportional allocation; see the survey by Lindner and Rothe [2016] for more details.
e relation between e ciency and fairness with connected pieces is also well-understood for divisible items. Aumann and Dombb [2015] studied the e ciency loss of fair allocations under connectivity constraints. e papers by Bei et al. [2012] and Aumann et al. [2013] considered the computational complexity of nding an allocation with connected pieces maximising utilitarian social welfare. Bei et al. [2012] showed that utilitarian social welfare is inapproximable when requiring that the allocation satisfy proportionality; however, without the proportionality requirement, Aumann et al. [2013] proved that there is a polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm for nding an allocation maximising utilitarian social welfare. e algorithm in [Aumann et al., 2013] works also for indivisible items and so applies to our se ing when G is a path. A paper by Conitzer et al. [2004] considers combinatorial auctions; translated to our se ing, their results imply that one can nd a Pareto-optimal connected allocation in polynomial time, when G is a graph of bounded treewidth and agents have unit demand: each agent has a connected demanded bundle such that agents have positive utility if and only if they obtain a superset of the demanded bundle.
In the context of division of indivisible items, Bouveret et al. [2017] formalized the model of fair division with the extra feature that each bundle needs to be connected in the underlying item graph. While they showed that nding an envy-free or proportional connected allocation is NP-hard even on paths, they proved that an allocation satisfying the maximin fair share always exists and can be found in polynomial time when the graph is acyclic; subsequently Lonc and Truszczynski [2018] studied the computational complexity of nding an MMS allocation when the graph G is a cycle. Independently of Bouveret et al. [2017] , Suksompong [2017] considered the problem when the items lie on a path, obtaining approximations to several fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. e recent works of Bilò et al. [2018] and Oh et al. [2018] study the existence of EF1 allocations with connected pieces. ey both showed that an EF1 allocation exists when agents have identical valuations. Bilò et al. [2018] also proved that for up to four agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, an EF1 allocation connected on a path is guaranteed to exist. Finally, Aziz et al. [2016] studied the computational complexity of nding Pareto-improvements of a given allocation when agents have additive preferences, in the se ing without connectivity constraints. Technically, our hardness proofs use similar techniques to hardness proofs obtained by H. Aziz et al. [2013] in the context of hedonic games.
PRELIMINARIES
For an integer s ∈ N, write [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. Let N = [n] be a set of agents and G = (V , E) be an undirected graph whose vertices are called items. A subset X of V is connected if it induces a connected subgraph of G. We write C(V ) ⊆ 2 V for the set of connected subsets of V , also called bundles.
Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function u i : C(V ) → R over connected bundles which satis es u i (∅) = 0 and is monotonic, so X ⊆ Y implies u i (X ) u i (Y ) . A valuation function u i is additive if u i (X ) = ∈X u i ({ }) for each X ∈ C(V ). We write u i ( ) = u i ({ }) for short. An additive valuation function is binary if u i ( ) ∈ {0, 1} for all ∈ V . If an agent i has a binary valuation function, we say that i approves item if u i ( ) = 1.
A (connected) allocation is a function π : N → C(V ) assigning each agent a connected bundle of items, such that each item is allocated exactly once, i.e., i ∈N π (i) = V and π (i) ∩ π (j) = ∅ for each pair of distinct agents i, j ∈ N . For an allocation π and a subset N of agents, we denote by π | N the allocation restricted to N .
Given an allocation π , another allocation π is a Pareto-improvement of π if u i (π (i)) u i (π (i)) for all i ∈ N and u j (π (j)) > u j (π (j)) for some j ∈ N . We say that a connected allocation π is Pareto-optimal (or Pareto-e cient, or PO for short) if there is no connected allocation that is a Pareto-improvement of π . e utilitarian social welfare of an allocation π is i ∈N u i (π (i)). It is easy to see that a connected allocation which maximizes utilitarian social welfare among connected allocations is Pareto-optimal.
A connected allocation satis es EF1 [Bilò et al., 2018 , Oh et al., 2018 if for any pair of agents i, j ∈ N , either u i (π (i)) u i (π (j)) or there is an item ∈ π (j) such that π (j)\{ } remains connected and u i (π (i)) u i (π (j) \ { }). us, whenever i envies the bundle of agent j, then the envy vanishes if we remove one outer item from the envied bundle.
Let Π n (G) denote the set of partitions of V into n connected bundles of the graph G. e maximin fair share of an agent i ∈ N is mms i = max
A connected allocation π is an MMS allocation if u i (π (i)) mms i for each agent i ∈ N . Bouveret et al. [2017] show that if G is a tree, an MMS allocation exists. Note that this de nition of the MMS value varies with the graph G, and may be lower than the standard MMS values where the maximisation is taken over all partitions, with no connectivity constraints. Finally we introduce some graph-theoretic terminology. Given a graph G = (V , E) and a subset X ⊆ V of vertices, we denote by G \ X the subgraph of G induced by V \ X . e diameter of G is the maximum distance between any pair of vertices. For two paths P 1 = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s ) and P 2 = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b t ), we de ne the concatenation P 1 P 2 of P 1 and P 2 as follows: P 1 P 2 := (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s , b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b t ), where there is a new edge between a s and b 1 . e concatenation of a nite sequence of paths P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k can be de ned inductively.
FINDING SOME PARETO-OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
We start by considering the problem of producing some Pareto-optimal allocation, without imposing any additional constraints on the quality of this allocation. When there are no connectivity requirements (equivalently, when G is a complete graph) and valuations are additive, this problem is trivial: Simply allocate each item separately to an agent i who has a highest valuation u i ( ) for . e resulting allocation maximizes utilitarian social welfare and is thus Pareto-optimal. When G is not complete, this procedure can produce disconnected bundles. We could try to give all items to a single agent (which satis es our constraints provided that G is connected), but the result need not be Pareto-optimal. Is it still possible to nd a Pareto-optimal allocation for speci c graph topologies in polynomial time?
Paths and Stars
For very simple graphs and additive valuations, the answer is positive. Our rst algorithm works when G is a path. e algorithm identi es an agent i with a nonzero valuation for the item at the le end of the path G, and then allocates all items to i, except for any items at the right end of the path which i values at 0. We then recursively call the same algorithm to decide on how to allocate the remaining items. T 3.1. When G is a path, and with additive valuations, a Pareto-optimal allocation can be found in polynomial time.
P
. e path G is given by V = { 1 , 2 , . . . , m } where { j , j+1 } ∈ E for each j ∈ [m − 1]. For a subset V of V , we denote by min V the vertex of minimum index in V .
We design a recursive algorithm A that takes as input a subset N of agents, a subpath G = (V , E ) of G, and a valuation pro le (u i ) i ∈N , and returns a Pareto-optimal allocation of the items in V to the agents in N . Without loss of generality, we may assume that there is an agent who likes the le -most vertex of G , i.e., u i (min V ) > 0 for some i ∈ N , since otherwise we can arbitrarily allocate that item later without a ecting Pareto-optimality.
If |N | = 1, then the algorithm allocates all items V to the single agent. Suppose that |N | > 1. e algorithm rst nds an agent i who has positive value for min V ; it then allocates to i a minimal connected bundle V i ⊆ V containing all items in V to which i assigns positive utility (so that u i (V i ) = u i (V )). To decide on the allocation of the remaining items, we apply A to the reduced instance
We will prove by induction on |N | that the allocation produced by A is Pareto-optimal. is is clearly true when |N | = 1. Suppose that A returns a Pareto-optimal allocation when |N | = k − 1; we will prove it for |N | = k. Let π be the allocation returned by A, where A chose agent i and allocated the bundle V i before making a recursive call. Assume for a contradiction that there is a Pareto-improvement π of π . us, in particular, u i (π (i)) u i (π (i)). Hence, by the algorithm's choice of the bundle V i , we must have V i ⊆ π (i) and u i (π (i)) = u i (π (i)). Hence, there must be an agent j di erent from i who receives strictly higher value in π than in π . Now, since G \π (i) is a subgraph of G \V i , the allocation π | N \{i } is an allocation for the instance
us, π | N \{i } is a Pareto-improvement of the allocation π | N \{i } . But π | N \{i } is the allocation returned by A for the instance I , contradicting the inductive hypothesis that A returns Paretooptimal allocations for |N | = k − 1.
Another graph type for which we can nd a Pareto-optimum is a star. In fact, we can e ciently calculate an allocation maximizing utilitarian social welfare. Note that when G is a star, at most one agent can receive two or more items. is allows us to translate welfare maximization into a bipartite matching instance. T 3.2. When G is a star, and valuations are additive, a Pareto-optimal allocation can be found in polynomial time.
. We give an algorithm to nd an allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare. Let G be a star with center vertex c and m − 1 leaves. We start by guessing an agent i ∈ N who receives the item c. By connectedness, every other agent can receive at most one (leaf) item. To allocate the leaf items, we construct a weighted bipartite graph H i with bipartition (N , V \ {c}) where N consists of agents j ∈ N \ {i} together with m − 1 copies i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m−1 of agent i. ( ese copies represent 'slots' in i's bundle.) Each edge of form {j, } for j ∈ N \ {i} has weight u j ( ) and each edge of form {i k , } has weight u i ( ).
Observe that each connected allocation in which i obtains c can be identi ed with a matching in H i : Every leaf object is either matched with the agent receiving it, or is matched with some copy i k of i if the object is part of i's bundle. Note that utilitarian social welfare of this allocation equals the total weight of the matching. Since one can nd a maximum-weight matching in a bipartite graph in polynomial time [see, e.g., Korte and Vygen, 2006] , we can nd an allocation of maximum utilitarian social welfare e ciently.
We have shown that nding a Pareto-optimum is easy for paths and for stars. An interesting open problem is whether the problem is also easy for caterpillars, a class of graphs containing both paths and stars. One might be able to combine the approaches of eorems 3.1 and 3.2 to handle them, but the details are di cult. Note that caterplliars are precisely the graphs of pathwidth 1; we discuss a negative result about graphs of pathwidth 2 below. Another open problem is whether nding a Pareto-optimum is easy when G is a cycle.
Hardness Results
For more general classes of graphs, the news is less positive. We show that, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which produces a Pareto-optimal allocation when G is an arbitrary tree even for binary valuations. Notably, this result implies that it is NP-hard to nd allocations maximizing any type of social welfare (utilitarian, leximin, Nash) when G is a tree, since such allocations are also Pareto-optimal. To obtain our hardness result, we rst consider a more general problem which is easier to handle, namely the case where G is a forest. Since a Pareto-optimum always exists, we cannot employ the standard approach of showing that a decision problem is NP-hard via many-one reductions; instead we will show (using a Turing reduction) that a polynomial-time algorithm producing a connected Pareto-optimal allocation could be used to solve an NP-complete problem in polynomial time. T 3.3. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal connected allocation when G is a union of vertex-disjoint paths of size 3, even if valuations are binary and additive.
P
. We give a Turing reduction from E 3 C (X3C). Recall that an instance of X3C is given by a set of elements X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 3r } and a family S = {S 1 , . . . , S s } of three-element subsets of X ; it is a 'yes'-instance if and only if there is an exact cover S ⊆ S with |S | = r and S ∈S S = X . For a set S ∈ S, order the three elements of S in some canonical way (e.g., alphabetically) and write S 1 , S 2 , S 3 for the elements in that order.
Given an instance (X , S) of X3C, for each S ∈ S, construct a path P S on three vertices S,1 , S,2 , S,3 . Let G = S ∈S P S . For each element x ∈ X , we introduce an agent i x with u i x ( S, j ) = 1 i S j = x, and u i x ( S, j ) = 0 otherwise. us, agent i x approves all instances of x. We also introduce s − r dummy agents d 1 , . . . , d s−r who approve every item, so u d k ( S, j ) = 1 for all j, k, S. Note that for each agent i x , a highest-value connected bundle has value 1, while a highest-value bundle for a dummy agent d k a highest-value connected bundle has value 3.
Suppose we had an algorithm A which nds a Pareto-optimal allocation. We show how to use A to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimal allocation π . We claim that the X3C instance (X , S) has a solution i
Since (3.1) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence our problem is NP-hard. Suppose π satis es condition (3.1). We then construct a solution to the instance of X3C. For each
en S is a solution: Clearly |S | = r ; further, for every x ∈ X , we have that π (i x ) ∈ P S for some S ∈ S, and since u i x (π (i x )) = 1 by (3.1), this implies that x ∈ S. us, S ∈S S = X . Hence, S is a solution to the X3C instance (X , S). Conversely, suppose there is a solution S to the instance of X3C, but suppose for a contradiction that π fails condition (3.1). De ne the following allocation π * : For each x ∈ X , identify a set S ∈ S and an index j ∈ [3] such that S j = x and set π * (i x ) = { S, j }; next, write S \ S = {S 1 , . . . , S s−r } and set
. en π * satis es (3.1). Since π fails (3.1), the allocation π * Pareto-dominates π , contradicting that π is Pareto-optimal. Hence, π satis es (3.1), as desired.
From this result, it immediately follows (for forests) that it is (weakly) NP-hard under Turing reductions to decide whether a given allocation is Pareto-optimal: if we could decide this in polynomial time, we could use such an algorithm to construct a Pareto-improvement, and by using this algorithm repeatedly, we could nd a Pareto-optimum.
Building on the above reduction, we nd that it is also hard to nd a Pareto-e cient allocation when G is a tree. T 3.4. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal connected allocation when G is a tree, even if valuations are binary and additive.
. To extend the reduction in the proof of eorem 3.3 to trees, we rst 'double' the reduction, in making a copy of each object and a copy of each agent with the same preference as the original agent. Speci cally, given an instance (X , S) of X3C, we create the same instance as in the proof of eorem 3.3; that is, we make a path P S = ( S,1 , S,2 , S,3 ) for each S ∈ S, and construct agent i x for each x ∈ X and dummy agents d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d s−r with the same binary valuations. In addition, we make a pathP S of copiesˆ S,1 ,ˆ S,2 ,ˆ S,3 of each S ∈ S. We then make a copyî x of each agent i x (x ∈ X ) together with copiesd 1 ,d 2 , . . . ,d s−r of the dummy agents. We also introduce a new dummy item c which serves as the center of a tree; speci cally, we a ach the center to the middle vertex S,2 of the path P S , and the middle vertexˆ S,2 of the pathP S , for each S ∈ S. e resulting graph G is a tree consisting of 2r + 2|S| paths of length 3, each a ached to the vertex c by their middle vertex. See Figure 1 .
No agent has positive value for the center dummy item. Copied agents only value copied objects and have the same valuations as the corresponding original agents, and non-copied agents only value non-copied objects. Formally, for each element x ∈ X , each k ∈ [s − r ], and each item , agents' binary valuations are given as follows:
. . , d s−r } for the set of original agents, and V o = S ∈S { S,1 , S,2 , S,3 } for the set of original items. Suppose we had an algorithm A which nds a Pareto-optimal allocation. We show how to use A to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimum π . We may suppose without loss of generality that c π (i) for any i ∈ N o , since otherwise we can swap the roles of the originals and the copies. We may further assume that each original agent i ∈ N o only receives original items, i.e., π (i) ⊆ V o , since we can move any other items from π (i) into other bundles without making anyone worse o . Hence, since c π (i), we see that
We now prove that the X3C instance has a solution i
Since (3.2) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence our problem is NP-hard. If (3.2) holds, then the argument in the proof of eorem 3.3 applies and shows that the X3C instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S ⊆ S to the X3C instance. en, as in the proof of eorem 3.3, there is an allocation π * : N o → C(V o ) of the original items to the original agents such that
Extend π * to all agents by de ning π * (ĵ) = π (ĵ) ∩ (V \ V o ) for every copied agentĵ. It is easy to check that π * is a connected allocation. For each copied agentĵ, we have uĵ (π * (ĵ)) = uĵ (π (ĵ)), sinceĵ has a valuation of 0 for every item in V o . Also, for each original agent i ∈ N o , we have u i (π * (i)) u i (π (i)), since i obtains an optimal bundle under π * . It follows that if π fails (3.2), then π * is a Pareto-improvement of π , contradicting that π is Pareto-optimal. So π satis es (3.2).
We note that the graph constructed in the above proof has pathwidth 2 and diameter 5, so hardness holds even for trees of bounded pathwidth and bounded diameter. One can adapt our reduction to show that hardness also holds on trees with maximum degree 3, by copying our original reduction many times. See Figure 2 for the structure of the resulting graph.
T 3.5. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal connected allocation when G is a tree with maximum degree 3, even if valuations are binary and additive.
. We give a Turing reduction from X3C similar to eorem 3.4. Given an instance (X , S) of X3C, with X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 3r } and S = {S 1 , . . . , S s }, we build the following instance.
b S1
. . .
. . . Our set of agents will consist of s + 1 copies of the set of agents in the reduction of eorem 3.3. So, for each f = 1, . . . , s + 1, we introduce the following agents:
e complete set of agents is then N = N 1 ∪ · · · ∪ N s+1 . We call each of the sets N f a family of agents.
e set of items is We next specify the agents' binary valuations. Unless otherwise speci ed, each agent has valuation 0 for each item. For each f = 1, . . . , s + 1, and for each x ∈ X , the agent i Suppose we had an algorithm A which nds a Pareto-optimal allocation. We show how to use A to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimum π .
ere are s items in B, and there are s + 1 families, so there is some family such that no item in B is allocated to any family member. at is, there is some family f such that b S π (i f ) for all S ∈ S and all i f ∈ N f . In particular, by connectedness of π , this means that no agent in N f receives items from two di erent "arms" of G. Write V f = S ∈S P f S . We may assume that π (i f ) ⊆ V f for every i f ∈ N f , since we can move any other items from π (i) into other bundles without making anyone worse o . Hence, we see that
Since (3.3) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence our problem is NP-hard.
If (3.3) holds, then the argument in the proof of eorem 3.3 applies and shows that the X3C instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S ⊆ S to the X3C instance. en, as in the proof of eorem 3.3, there is an allocation π * : N f → C(V f ) of items to the agents in family f such that
It is easy to check that π * is a connected allocation. For each agent j ∈ N \ N f , we have u j (π * (j)) = u j (π (j)), since j has a valuation of 0 for every item in V f . Also, for each agent i ∈ N f , we have u i (π * (i)) u i (π (i)), since i obtains an optimal bundle under π * . It follows that if π fails (3.3), then π * is a Pareto-improvement of π , contradicting that π is Pareto-optimal. So π satis es (3.3).
In the last section, we saw positive results for paths and stars when valuations are additive. For more general preferences over bundles, we again obtain a hardness result. T 3.6. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal connected allocation when G is a path, when valuations are 2-additive. e problem is also hard when G is a star and valuations are 2-additive. Both problems are also hard for dichotomous valuations speci ed by a formula of propositional logic.
(Note that this is di erent from binary additive valuations, which are dichotomous only if an agent approves at most one item.) A (monotonic) dichotomous valuation function can be speci ed by a propositional goal formula φ over the items V using only positive literals, such that u i (X ) = 1 if and only if φ is satis ed by the variable assignment that sets exactly the variables in X to true. For example, an agent with goal formula ( 1 ∧ 2 ) ∨ 3 has positive utility for all bundles X ∈ C with { 1 , 2 } ⊆ X or with 3 ∈ X . For more on such valuations, see Bouveret and Lang [2008] .
For a set X , let B(X ) = {Y ⊆ X : 1 |Y | 2} be the collection of subsets of X (not necessarily connected) of size 1 or 2. A valuation function u i : C(V ) → R is 2-additive if there is a function w i : B(V ) → R such that
2-additive valuation functions allow agents to specify that two items i , j are complements (if
. We give a Turing reduction from X3C similar to eorem 3.3.
Given an instance (X , S) of X3C, with X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 3r } and S = {S 1 , . . . , S s }, we build the following instance. For each S ∈ S, construct a path P S on three vertices S,1 , S,2 , S,3 . We construct the graph G by concatenating the paths P S 1 , . . . , P S s in that order. For each x ∈ X , we write V x = { S, j ∈ V : S j = x }. We say that , ∈ V x are consecutive if and there is no ∈ V x that appears in between and on the path G. For each element x ∈ X , we introduce an agent i x whose most-preferred bundles are those that contain some item ∈ V x . We also introduce s − r dummy agents d 1 , . . . , d s−r whose mostpreferred bundles are those which completely contain at least one path P S . ese preferences can be implemented by 2-additive valuation functions, where
Unless we explicitly specify, each agent has zero value for X ∈ B(V ). We now show that these 2-additive valuation functions correctly implement the above statements about most-preferred bundles. For agent i x , if X ∈ C(V ) is a bundle containing no item ∈ V x , then u i x (X ) = 0. On the other hand, if |X ∩ V x | = q 1, then X contains q − 1 pairs of consecutive members of V x (because X is connected on the path G), and hence u i x (X ) = q − (q − 1) = 1. For agent d k , let X ∈ C(V ) be a bundle. Note that P S ⊆ X i { S,1 , S,3 } ⊆ X by connectedness of X . us, if X P S for every S ∈ S, then u i (X ) = 0. On the other hand, if X contains k paths P S j , . . . , P S j+k −1 , then u i (X ) = k − (k − 1) = 1. Now, suppose we have an algorithm A which, given 2-additive valuations, can nd a Paretooptimum on a path. We show that A can be used to decide X3C. Run A on our allocation instance constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimal allocation π . We claim that the X3C instance has a solution if and only if u i x (π (i x )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
If (3.4) holds, then each bundle π (d k ) contains at least one path P S and hence a total of s −r paths are allocated to agents d 1 , . . . , d s−r . Hence the items R = x ∈X π (i x ) allocated to the remaining agents are contained within at most r paths corresponding to at most r sets in S. But by (3.4), R ∩ V x ∅ for each x ∈ X , hence there is a collection of at most r sets from S that cover X , and so the X3C instance has a solution.
Suppose S ⊆ S is a solution to the X3C instance. De ne the allocation π * like in eorem 3.3. en π * satis es (3.4). Now, if π does not satisfy (3.4), then π * would Pareto-dominate π , a contradiction. Hence π satis es (3.4).
e same proof works for dichotomous valuations, since the speci cation about agents' mostpreferred bundles can be speci ed by propositional logic, where for each x ∈ X , agent i x 's goal formula is S, j:S j =x S, j , and for each k
. We give a Turing reduction from V C , which asks whether given an undirected graph H = (W , E) and positive integer k, there is a vertex cover, i.e., a subset W ⊆ W of k vertices such that for each edge {w 1 , w 2 } ∈ E, either w 1 ∈ W or w 2 ∈ W [Garey and Johnson, 1979] .
Given an instance (H, k) of V C , we take an instance with item set V = W ∪ {c}, an underlying graph G which is a star with center c, and the agent set consists of an agent i plus dummy agents d 1 , . . . , d |W |−k . Agents' preferences are speci ed so that i's most-preferred bundles are exactly those that contain a vertex cover of G, and so that, for each j ∈ [|V | − k], d j 's most-preferred bundles are exactly the non-empty ones. Such preferences can be implemented by 2-additive valuation functions, where
Unless we explicitly specify, each agent has zero value for X ∈ B(V ). Note that, for a bundle X ∈ C(V ), we have u i (X ) = w ∈W ∩X degree H (w) − |{e ∈ E : e ⊆ X }| = |{e ∈ E : e ∩ X ∅}|, that is, u i (X ) is the number of edges covered by the vertices W ∩ X . Hence, u i (X ) |E|, with equality i X contains a vertex cover of H . Further, whenever X ∈ C(V ) is nonempty, since G is a star, either X is a singleton and then u d j (X ) = 1, or X contains c and u d j (X ) = |X | − |X \ {c}| = 1. Hence, these 2-additive valuation functions correctly implement the above statements about most-preferred bundles. Now, suppose we have an algorithm A which, given 2-additive valuations, can nd a Paretooptimum on a star. We show that A can be used to decide V C . Run A on our allocation instance constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimal allocation π . We claim that H has a vertex cover of size k if and only if u i (π (i)) = |E| and
If (3.5) holds, then W = π (i) ∩ W is a vertex cover of H . We may assume that |W | 2, and hence c ∈ π (i). us, by connectivity in the star G, the bundles π (d j ) must be empty or singletons for each j ∈ [|V | − k]. But by (3.5), the bundles π (d j ) are all non-empty. us, |W | k, and hence there exists a vertex cover of H with size k.
Suppose W ⊆ W is a vertex cover of H with |W | = k. De ne the allocation π * where π * (i) = W ∪ {c} and π (d j ) is a singleton leaf from W \ W for each j ∈ [|V | − k]. en π * satis es (3.5). If π does not satisfy (3.5), then π * would Pareto-dominate π , a contradiction. Hence π satis es (3.5).
e same proof works for dichotomous valuations, since the speci cation about agents' mostpreferred bundles can be speci ed by propositional logic, where i's goal formula is {w 1 ,w 2 } ∈E (w 1 ∨ w 2 ) and d j 's goal formula is c ∨ w ∈W w for each j ∈ [|W | − k].
PARETO-OPTIMALITY & EF1 ON PATHS
In Section 3, we were aiming to nd some Pareto-optimum, and obtained a positive result for the important case where G is a path. Now we aim higher, wanting to nd an e cient allocation which is also fair, where by fairness we mean EF1.
When there are no connectivity requirements, it is known that e ciency and fairness are compatible: Caragiannis et al. [2016] showed that an allocation maximizing the Nash product of agents' valuations is both Pareto-optimal and EF1. While it is NP-hard to compute the Nash solution, Barman et al. [2018] designed a (pseudo-)polynomial-time algorithm which nds an allocation satisfying these two properties.
In our model, unfortunately, EF1 is incompatible with Pareto-optimality, even when G is a path. e following examples only require binary additive valuations and at most four agents. Note that Bilò et al. [2018] proved that an EF1 allocation always exists on a path for up to four agents.
Example 4.1. Consider an instance with four agents a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , b and a path with ten items 1 , . . . , 10 , and binary additive valuations as shown below. Suppose π is a Pareto-optimal EF1 allocation. en, for each i = 1, 2, 3, because b does not envy a i up to one good, we have { 5 , 6 } π (a i ). us, for each i = 1, 2, 3, either π (a i ) ⊆ { 1 , . . . , 5 } (and we say a i is in group L) or π (a i ) ⊆ { 6 , . . . , 10 } (and a i is in group R). Now, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 are not all in group L, since then one of them (say a 1 ) would receive at most 1 approved item, and there would be a Pareto-improvement by giving the four items { 7 , . . . , 10 } to a 1 . Similarly, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 are not all in group R. Hence, wlog, two agents (say a 1 , a 2 ) are in group L and one agent (say a 3 ) is in group R. Since π is Pareto-optimal, we have π (b) ⊆ { 5 , 6 }; if b were to obtain any other items (which b does not approve but every other agent does approve), then we can reallocate these items to obtain a Pareto-improvement. us, a 3 obtains four approved items, but one of a 1 or a 2 obtains at most two approved items, so π is not EF1, a contradiction.
e following alternative example shows that Pareto-optimality and EF1 con ict in an even more restricted se ing, where each agent's approval set is an interval. Suppose π is a Pareto-optimal EF1 allocation. en, for each i = 1, 2, because b does not envy a i up to one good, we have { 4 , 5 } π (a i ). us, for each i = 1, 2, we have either π (a i ) ⊆ { 1 , . . . , 4 } (and a i is in group L) or π (a i ) ⊆ { 5 , . . . , 11 } (and a i is in group R). Now, a 1 and a 2 are not both in group L, since then there would be a Pareto-improvement by giving the six items { 6 , . . . , 11 } to a 1 . Also, a 1 and a 2 are not both in group R, since then one of them (say a 1 ) would receive at most 3 approved items, and there would be a Pareto-improvement by giving items { 1 , 2 , 3 } to a 1 and { 6 , . . . , 11 } to a 2 . Hence, wlog, a 1 is in group L and a 2 is in group R. Since π is Pareto-optimal, we have π (b) ⊆ { 4 , 5 }; if b were to obtain any other items, then we can reallocate these items to a 1 and a 2 to obtain a Pareto-improvement. us, a 1 obtains at most four approved items (since π (a 1 ) ⊆ { 1 , . . . , 4 }), but a 2 receives at least six approved items (since { 6 , . . . , 11 } ⊆ π (a 2 )), so π is not EF1, a contradiction.
Given that we do not have an existence guarantee, a natural question is whether it is easy to decide whether a given instance admits a Pareto-optimal allocation satisfying EF1. Using the above examples, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. e obvious complexity upper bound is Σ p 2 ; an open problem is whether the problem is complete for this class. A related result of de Keijzer et al. [2009] shows that without connectivity constraints and with additive valuations, it is Σ p 2 -complete to decide whether a Pareto optimal and envy-free allocation exists; see also Bouveret and Lang [2008] . T 4.3. It is NP-hard to decide whether a Pareto-optimal EF1 connected allocation exists when G is a path, even if valuations are binary and additive.
P
. Given an instance (X , S) of X3C where X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 3r } and S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S s }, we again create the same instance I as in the proof of eorem 3.3. Namely, we make a path P S = ( S,1 , S,2 , S,3 ) for each S ∈ S, and construct agent i x for each x ∈ X and agents d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d s−r with the same binary valuations:
We write
. . , d s−r } for the set of the original agents, and V o = S ∈S { S,1 , S,2 , S,3 } for the set of original vertices. We will create additional items and agents as follows; unless we explicitly specify, each original agent has zero value for the additional items.
We create an empty PO and EF1 instance 
We create an empty PO and EF1 instance I x for each agent i x (x ∈ X ). e empty instance I x consists of a path P x = ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 11 ) as in Example 4.2, together with agent i x and agents a 1 x and a 2 x . Each i x approves the vertices x 4 and x 5 whereas agents a 1 x and a 2 x approve every vertex on the path but does not approve any other item outside P x . See below for these valuations.
x 7
x 8 x 9
x 10 x 11 a 1 x , a 2 x : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i x : 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Dummies: Note that the number of connected components of the graph constructed so far is s +3r +(s −r ) = 2s +2r . For each h ∈ [2s +2r ], we create a dummy agent z h and a path P z h = (
2 ) of two dummy vertices.
De ne the following three paths by concatenating pieces constructed above:
Our nal graph G is obtained by concatenating the paths P 1 , P 2 , P 3 in that order. Each dummy agent z h only approves the dummy vertices on the path P z h . us in any EF1 allocation, none of the non-dummy agent obtains a bundle containing both of the dummy vertices.
Correctness: We will show that there is a Pareto-optimal EF1 connected allocation if and only if there is an exact cover. First, suppose that there is a Pareto-optimal EF1 connected allocation π . By EF1, each non-dummy agent cannot obtain more than one connected component of the original graph. us, we may assume that for each agent i z h , the bundle π (i) is contained in some of the non-dummy paths in which i has approved vertices, i.e.,
• for each x ∈ X , π (i x ) ⊆ P α for some α ∈ S(x) ∪ {x } where S(x) is the set of S ∈ S containing x;
Now observe that for each x ∈ X , none of the agents except for i x approve the vertices outside P x . As we saw in Example 4.2, if π (i x ) ⊆ P x , and π (a j x ) ⊆ P x for each j = 1, 2, then π would not satisfy both Pareto-optimality and EF1. Hence, in the Pareto-optimal and EF1 allocation π , each agent i x receives a bundle outside of P x , namely, π (i x ) ⊆ P α for some α ∈ S(x). Also, to achieve EF1 and PO allocation of the path P x among the agents a 1 x and a 2 x , we must allocate the ve consecutive vertices of P x to one of the agents a 1 x and a 2 x , and allocate the remaining six vertices of the path to the other. By EF1, it follows that each agent i x receives a bundle containing at least one item which he approves.
Similarly, for each k ∈ [s − r ], none of the agents a 1 k , a 2 k , and b k approves the vertices outside of P d k . us, we must have π (d k ) ⊆ P α for some α ∈ S; otherwise, π would not be Pareto-optimal and EF1 as we have seen in Example 4.1. Also, by EF1, no agent other than b k can get both of the middle two vertices k 5 and k 6 which b k approves; thus, by Pareto-optimality, each agent b k is allocated the middle two vertices k 5 and k 6 of P d k . us, by Pareto-optimality, one of the agents a 1 k and a 2 k is allocated the rst four vertices of P d k and the other is allocated the last four vertices of P d k . It follows that to bound the envy of d k up to one item, each agent d k receives a bundle containing at least three items which he approves.
Combining the above observations, each of the original agents is allocated to some of the original vertices and the allocation π satis es u i x (π (i x )) 1 for all x ∈ X and
Hence there is an exact cover as we have seen in the proof of eorem 3.3. Conversely, suppose that there is an exact cover. en, as we proved in the proof of eorem 3.3, there is a perfect allocation π of the original instance satisfying the inequalities 4.1. We extend this allocation as follows
• each dummy agent z h obtains the associated dummy vertices in P z h ;
• for each k ∈ [s − r ], a 1 k receives the rst four vertices of the path P d k , a 2 k receives the last four vertices, and b k obtains the two vertices k 5 and k 6 ; and • for each x ∈ X , a 1 x the rst ve vertices of the path P x , and a 2 x obtains the last six vertices. e resulting allocation is Pareto-optimal since each item is allocated to an agent who approves it; also, it can be easily seen to satisfy EF1.
Observe that in the Examples 4.1 and 4.2, there are at least two di erent types of agents' valuations. One may expect that there are existence guarantees when agents have identical valuations, i.e., u i (X ) = u i (X ) for all bundles X ∈ C(V ) and all i, j ∈ N . Invoking a very recent result independently obtained by Bilò et al. [2018] and Oh et al. [2018] , we can show that this is the case for additive valuations: an EF1 and Pareto-optimal allocation exists on paths for agents with identical additive valuations. P 4.4. When G is a path and agents have identical additive valuations, a connected allocation that satis es EF1 and Pareto-optimality exists and can be found e ciently.
. When agents have identical additive valuations, every allocation π has the same utilitarian social welfare i ∈N u i (π (i)) = ∈V u 1 ( ). Hence, every allocation maximises social welfare and is thus Pareto-optimal. Now, Bilò et al. [2018, eorem 7 .1] and Oh et al. [2018, Lemma C.2] show that if G is a path, a connected EF1 allocation exists, which, by the above reasoning, is also Pareto-optimal. is allocation can be found e ciently since the existence results of Bilò et al. [2018] and Oh et al. [2018] both come with an e cient algorithm for nding an EF1 allocation.
For identical valuations that are not additive, Pareto-optimality and EF1 are again incompatible on a path. e following example uses two agents and four items, and subadditive valuations.
Example 4.5 (PO and EF1 may be incompatible for identical but non-additive valuations). We give an example with identical non-additive valuations, for which no Pareto-optimal allocation is EF1.
ere are four items a, b, c, d arranged on a path, and two agents with the following valuations:
One can check that these valuations are subadditive.
PARETO-OPTIMALITY & MMS ON PATHS
In the previous section, we saw that deciding the existence of an allocation that is Pareto-e cient and satis es EF1 is computationally hard, even if G is a path, and there are examples where no such allocation exists. Part of the reason is that envy-freeness notions and Pareto-optimality are not natural companions: it is easy to construct examples where some allocation is envy-free, yet by Pareto-improving the allocation, we introduce envy. An alternative notion of fairness avoids this problem: Pareto-improving upon an MMS allocation preserves the MMS property, because MMS only speci es a lower bound on agents' utilities. Bouveret et al. [2017] showed that if G is a tree, then an MMS allocation always exists (and can be found e ciently). Hence, if G is a tree, there is an allocation that is both Pareto-optimal and MMS: take an MMS allocation, and repeatedly nd Pareto-improvements until reaching a Pareto-optimum, which must still satisfy the MMS property.
While existence is guaranteed, it is unclear whether we can nd an allocation satisfying both properties in polynomial time. Certainly, by the negative result of eorem 3.4, this is not possible when G is an arbitrary tree. What about the case when G is a path? e answer is also negative: a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation cannot be found e ciently.
T 5.1. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation when G is a path, even if valuations are binary and additive.
P
. We again give a Turing reduction from X3C, building on the reduction of eorem 3.3. Suppose we are given an instance (X , S) of X3C, where X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 3r } and S = {S 1 , . . . , S s }. Construct the paths P S 1 , P S 2 , . . . , P S s and agents i x for each x ∈ X and d k for each k ∈ [s − r ] with binary utilities like in the proof of eorem 3.3. We write N o = { i x : x ∈ X } ∪ {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d s−r } and V o = S ∈S { S,1 , S,2 , S,3 } for the sets of agents and items introduced so far.
In addition, for each k ∈ [s], we construct a path B k of 2r + 2s new vertices
. e graph G for our problem is obtained by concatenating these paths in the order P 1 , B 1 , . . . , P s , B s . Finally, for each k ∈ [s], we introduce an agent z k who approves exactly the vertices on B k . e agents in N o do not approve any of the items in B 1 , . . . , B s .
Note that, in total, there are 3r + (s − r ) + s = 2r + 2s agents. Since each agent z k approves 2r + 2s vertices, each agent z k has positive MMS value, namely mms z k = 1.
Suppose we had an algorithm A which nds a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation on a path. We show how to use A to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimum π which satis es MMS. en, for each k ∈ [s], the agent z k receives at least one vertex from B k since π is MMS. It follows that no agent i ∈ N 0 can receive items from two di erent paths P S j and P S k , j < k, since these paths are separated by B j . us, for each i ∈ N 0 , there is some j ∈ [s] with π (i) ⊆ B j−1 ∪ P S j ∪ B j . By suitably reallocating items that agent i does not approve, we can in fact assume that
We now prove that the X3C instance has a solution i u i x (π (i x )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
Since (5.1) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence our problem is NP-hard. If (5.1) holds, then the argument in the proof of eorem 3.3 applies and shows that the X3C instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S ⊆ S to the X3C instance. en, as in the proof of eorem 3.3, there is an allocation π * : N o → C(V o ) of the original items to the original agents such that u i x (π * (i x )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
It is easy to check that π * is a connected allocation.
, since z k receives all approved items in π * Also, for each original agent i ∈ N o , we have u i (π * (i)) u i (π (i)), since i obtains an optimal bundle under π * . It follows that if π fails (5.1), then π * is a Pareto-improvement of π , contradicting that π is Pareto-optimal. So π satis es (5.1).
For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an allocation π is α-MMS if u i (π (i)) α · mms i for all i ∈ N . e above proof implies that we cannot in polynomial time nd a Pareto-optimal allocation that is α-MMS, for any α > 0. e reduction can also easily be adapted to the case when G is a cycle.
Next, we show that when G is a path, we can nd a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation in polynomial time for a restricted class of valuations. We assume that agents' valuations are binary and additive, and for each voter, the set of approved vertices forms an interval of the path G, and nally these intervals are non-nested. Formally, given binary and additive valuations and an agent i ∈ N , we let A(i) = { ∈ V : u i ( ) = 1} be the set of vertices which i approves. For a path P = (1, 2, . . . , m), we say that binary valuations are non-nested on the path if for each i ∈ N , A(i) is connected on the path, and there is no pair of agents i, j ∈ N with min A(i) < min A(j) and max A(j) < max A(i).
e corresponding restriction captures, for instance, when several groups wish to book the same conference venue; each group speci es a period of contiguous dates of (almost) equal length that are suitable for them. We show that when valuations have this form, there is a polynomial-time algorithm which yields a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation. e algorithm is an adaptation of the moving-knife algorithm of Bouveret et al. [2017] .
We rst observe that if agent i's approval interval appears before j' approval interval and these intervals intersect with each other, then the value of the le bundle exceeds i's maximin fair share before it exceeds j's maximin fair share. For j, k ∈ [m] with j k, we write [j, k] = {j, j + 1, . . . , k}. 
. If the interval [1, x] contains i's approval interval, i.e., max A(i) x, then i's value for [1, x] is at least her maximin fair share. us suppose that the last vertex of i's approval interval appears a er or at x + 1 (i.e., x + 1 max A(i)). Assume for a contradiction that agent i does not value [1, x] at least as highly as her maximin fair share, i.e., u i ([1, x]) < mms i . Since the min A(j) x + 1, we have min A(i) min A(j) x + 1; also, since x + 1 max A(i), we have that x + 1 max A(i) max A(j). By the contiguity, it follows that both i and j approves the item x + 1. Now let s denote the number of vertices approved by i in [1, x] . Similarly, let t denote the number of vertices approved by j in [1, x] . By the above argument, note that s t. Since [1, x] does not guarantee i's maximin fair share, i has value more than (n − 1)(s + 1) for
Otherwise, i's maximin fair share would be at most s. However, since j's value for [1, x] is at least his maximin fair share, j has value at most (n − 1)(t + 1) for
Otherwise, j's maximin fair share would be more than t. Now recall that s t, which implies (n − 1)(s + 1) (n − 1)(t + 1). is means that agent i has strictly more approved vertices in [x + 1, m] than agent j, namely, x + 1 max A(j) < max A(i), a contradiction. We are now ready to show that a moving-knife algorithm can be used to produce a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation. Intuitively, that following algorithm sequentially creates a connected bundle for i 1 , i 2 , and so on, such that we add one vertex to the bundle of i j as long as this bundle does not exceed the maximin fair share of the agent i j+1 . By doing so, we can ensure that each agent receives a connected bundle of at least maximin fair share and every item has been allocated to an agent who approves of it if there is any. Hence, the resulting allocation maximizes the utilitarian social welfare and so is Pareto-optimal. In what follows, we denote by mms i (I ) the maximin fair share of i for the instance I with subpath P , agent set N , and valuations (u i ) i ∈N . Namely,
for each i ∈ N where n = |N |.
T 5.3. When the graph G is a path and valuations are binary and additive given by nonnested intervals on the path, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that nds an MMS connected allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare.
. We design a recursive algorithm A that takes as input the instance I with a subset N of agents, a subpath P = (1, 2, . . . , m), and a valuation pro le (u i ) i ∈N , and returns a utilitarian optimal MMS allocation of the items to the agents in N . We write n := |N |. Assume without loss of generality that that every item is approved by some agent, and every agent approves some item. If n = 1, then the algorithm allocates all the items to the single agent. Suppose that n > 1.
(1) Order agents as i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n so that min
•
Recurse, by relabeling items so that the le -most item is again called 1. See Figures 4 for an illustration. Note that the reduced instance still remains non-nested since otherwise there would be a pair of agents i, j in the original instance with min A(i) < min A(j) and max A(j) < max A(i).
One can compute the maximin fair share of each agent in polynomial time if the graph is a path [Bouveret et al., 2017] ; thus it is immediate that A runs in polynomial time. Now we will prove by induction on the number of agents the following:
• agent i ∈ N receives a connected bundle of value at least mms i (I ); and • every approved item (i.e., some i ∈ N approves ) has been allocated to some agent in N approving .
e claim is immediate for |N | = 1. Suppose that the claim holds for |N | = − 1; we will prove it for |N | = . Let π denote the allocation returned by the algorithm. To show that every approved item has been allocated to some player, observe rst that agent i 1 has positive value for every approved item in π (i 1 ). Indeed, by construction of the algorithm, agent i 1 does not receive any item that appears a er max A(i 1 ); and no agent i k with k > 1 approves item that appears before min A(i 1 ). Also, there is no item π (i 1 ) only approved by agent i 1 : If there is such an item π (i 1 ), then it means that x < but ∈ A(i 1 ) \ A(i 2 ), and thereby x < < min A(i 2 ) max A(i 1 ).
Hence, [1, x] ∩ A(i 2 ) = ∅ and ∈ π (i 1 ), a contradiction. Applying the induction hypothesis, every approved item not in π (i 1 ) is allocated to some player in N \ {i 1 } who approves that item.
Now it remains to prove that every agent receives a bundle of value at least his maximin fair share. Clearly, agent i 1 receives a bundle of value at least mms i 1 (I ). Take any i k with k > 1. Let I denote the reduced instance a er the bundle for i 1 is removed. It is clear that mms i k (I ) mms i k (I ) if i k approves no vertex in π (i 1 ) or mms i k (I ) = 0. So suppose otherwise, i.e., agent i k approves at least one vertex in π (i 1 ) and has positive maximin fair share mms i k (I ) > 0. Now let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be a partition of P into connected bundles witnessing mms i k (I ), i.e., mms i k (I ) = min h ∈[n ] u i k (X h ). Without loss of generality, we assume that the le most item 1 belongs to X 1 . Since u i k (X 1 ) mms i k (I ) > 0, i k approves at least one vertex in X 1 , thereby implying that the initial vertex of i k 's approval interval appears before or at the right-most vertex of X 1 . Since min A(i 2 ) min A(i k ), it means that [1, x] ∩ A(i 2 ) ∅ and hence π (i 1 ) = [1, x]. By Lemma 5.2, since i k values X 1 at least as highly as her maximin fair share at I , i 1 evaluates X 1 at least as valuable as her maximin fair share at I . Now due to the minimality of x, we get that [1, x] ⊆ X 1 . Hence, it follows that ((X 1 \ X ) ∪ X 2 , X 3 , . . . , X |N | ) is a partition certifying that mms i k (I ) mms i k (I ).
us, by the induction hypothesis, every i k with k > j receives a connected bundle of value at least mms i k (I ).
We give an example where the algorithm used in eorem 5.3 fails to nd a PO and MMS allocation when agents' preferences are given by approval intervals that do not obey the non-nestedness condition.
Example 5.4 (Example where the moving-knife algorithm fails for nested intervals). Consider an instance with two agents and ve vertices on a path, with binary additive valuations as below. Applying the algorithm in eorem 5.3, we give { 1 , 2 } to Alice and { 3 , 4 , 5 } to Bob. is allocation is Pareto-dominated by the allocation giving { 1 , 2 , 3 } to Bob and { 4 , 5 } to Alice. Noticeably, this example does not admit an MMS allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare: the unique utilitarian optimal allocation is the allocation giving everything to Alice, which clearly violates the MMS requirement for Bob.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we have studied the computational complexity of nding Pareto-e cient outcomes, in the natural se ing where we need to allocate indivisible items into connected bundles. We showed that although nding a Pareto-optimal allocation is easy for some topologies, this does not extend to general trees. Further, we proved that when imposing additional fairness requirements, nding a Pareto-optimum becomes NP-hard even when the underlying item graph is a path. We have also seen that a Pareto-optimal EF1 allocation may not exist with the contiguity requirement while such an allocation always exists when these requirements are ignored.
While we have focused on the divisions of goods, studying an allocation of chores with graphconnectivity constraints is an interesting future direction. In particular, one may ask what graph structures give positive results in terms of both existence and computational complexity. Finally, several recent papers studied the fair division problem over social networks [Abebe et al., 2017 , Bei et al., 2017 , Bredereck et al., 2018 , Gourvés et al., 2017 where a social network describes the envy relation between agents. A particular focus is laid on local envy-freeness, requiring that each agent does not envy the bundle of her neighbours. Although our graph describes a relationship among items rather than agents, it would be interesting to analyze 'intermediate' cases. For example, suppose that we only focus on the envy between a pair of agents who are allocated adjacent bundles in G, what graph structure guarantees the existence of a locally envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocation?
